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New Evidence on the Labor Supply Effects
of the Social Security Earnings Test
Leora Friedberg, University of Virginia and National Bureau of Economic Research
Anthony Webb, Boston College Center for Retirement Research
Executive Summary
This paper investigates the impact on labor supply of changes in the Social Se-
curity earnings test in 1996 and 2000. We highlight how inertia in labor supply
choices influences responses to policy changes. We do this in two ways. First,
we show that taking account of last year’s employment status is important in
estimating responses to current earnings test changes, a step that has not always
been taken in the literature. Second, we test the effect of not only actual but also
anticipated earnings test parameters that cohorts faced at earlier ages. This ap-
proach demonstrates that past and anticipated future rules influence current
employment and earnings. Thus we identify an impact of earnings test changes
on employment at ages that are younger than those directly affected and in
years that follow the direct change. Finally, we show that earnings test changes
that were initiated in 1996 had an effect, in addition to the changes in 2000 that
have been recently studied by others. Overall, we predict that the elimination of
the earnings test in 2000 raised employment among Health and Retirement
Study respondents by around 2 percentage points at ages 66–69 and 3.5 points
at age 65, with gains persisting as exposed cohorts aged and also arising at
younger ages due to the shock to anticipated earnings test rules.
I. Introduction
The earnings test, which reduces benefits for people who continue to
work after claiming Social Security, has been altered more often and
more substantially than most other Social Security provisions, always
in the direction of encouraging more work at older ages. Yet, for those
who understand fully the Social Security rules, it is a surprise that it has
much if any impact on labor supply, as benefits lost to the earnings test
are returned to beneficiaries latero ni na c t u a r i a l l yn e u t r a lf o r m .A
worker who loses current benefits to the earnings test gains a higher
flow of benefits later on, and the expected present value of that flow
equals the current loss for someone with an average lifespan. Thus,
© 2009 by the National Bureau of Economic Research. All rights reserved.
978‐0‐226‐07654‐6/2009/2009‐0001$10.00the average worker who wants to continue to work after becoming eligi-
ble for Social Security should make the decision on grounds other than
the earnings test.
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In spite of this, popular guides to retirement planning make note of
the earnings test but not of the actuarial adjustment arising from for-
gone benefits, suggesting that people may view it as a pure tax on
work. Moreover, previous research shows that the earnings test has
had substantial effects on hours choices among older people who con-
tinue to work. Friedberg (1998, 2000) found that Social Security benefi-
ciaries bunched their earnings in significant amounts just at or below
the threshold earnings where the earnings test begins to apply and that
this bunching “moved” in response to earlier steps to liberalize the
earnings test rules, for example, by shifting upward to the new higher
thresholds that were implemented in 1978 and disappearing when the
earnings test was abolished for ages 70–72 in 1983.
O u rc u r r e n tr e s e a r c hc o n t i n u e st h i sa n a l y s i sb ys t u d y i n gm a j o r
changes to earnings test rules that were legislated in 1996 and 2000.
It also focuses on retirement as well as hours choices among workers,
an important emphasis in light of recent trends in retirement. Following
decades of decline, the average retirement age stabilized in the 1980s
and has started to rise more recently (Friedberg 2007). The delays in
retirement mean that growing numbers of workers are confronting
the earnings test.
In theory, even if the earnings test is viewed as a tax, it will only affect
retirement if labor supply is constrained in some way so that work
hours must be high; otherwise, it is always possible to work less than
the earnings test threshold and not face the earnings test penalty. The
nature and importance of such constraints on labor supply choices re-
mains uncertain.
By using new sources of longitudinal data on labor supply transitions
and by testing for effects of not only current but also past earnings test
parameters that cohorts faced, we show that constraints on labor
supply and consequent persistence of labor supply choices affect re-
sponses to the earnings test. We find that employment as well as hours
increased after the earnings test was liberalized. We also find that tak-
ing account of last year’s labor force status is important in measuring
responses to earnings test changes in the current year and that past and
anticipated future earnings test rules, and not just the current rules, af-
fect current labor supply.
We use our estimates to predict the effect of the elimination of the
earnings test in 2000 on employment in the Health and Retirement
Friedberg and Webb 2Study (HRS), and we find resulting increases of around 2 percentage
points at ages 66–69 and 3.5 points at age 65. As the exposed cohorts
then age, employment remains about a percentage point (1.5) higher in
2001 and about a half a percentage point (0.9) higher in 2002 for ages
66–69 (age 65). Moreover, employment rates at younger ages increase
by about 1 percentage point due to the shock to anticipated earnings
test rules.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss
the earnings test rules along with theoretical predictions and past em-
pirical analysis of the impact on labor supply. In Section III we describe
the data and in Section IV the results from our analysis of the Current
Population Survey and the Health and Retirement Study. We conclude
in Section V.
II. Background
In this section, we discuss the earnings test rules along with theoretical
predictions and past empirical analysis of the impact on labor supply.
We distinguish between predictions when labor supply is freely chosen
or is subject to constraints that can influence responses to the earnings
test, and we discuss the degree to which previous studies recognize
such constraints.
A. The Social Security Earnings Test
The impact of current earnings on benefits. Social Security beneficiaries
who earn too much at particular ages suffer a reduction in their current
Social Security benefits, with the benefits deferred to later ages, as we
describe later. Beneficiaries between ages 62 and 64 in 2005 lost $1 in
benefits for every $2 in earnings above an annual threshold of $12,000.
The rules at ages 62–64 have been stable since the 1970s, with the earn-
ings threshold increasing with the rate of annual wage inflation.
In contrast, the rules faced at ages 65–69 have been looser since 1978.
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As highlighted in table 1, the earnings test threshold before 1996 was
about one‐third higher than it was for ages 62–64, and the benefit re-
duction rate was 331
3% for earnings above the threshold. Legislation
passed in 1996 then raised the threshold at ages 65–69 in stages. It
jumped from $11,280 in 1995 to $12,500 in 1996; rose in scheduled an-
nual increments of $1,000 until reaching $15,500 in 1999; and then was
set to hit $17,000 in 2000, $25,000 in 2001, and $30,000 in 2002. In 2000,
however,anewlaweliminatedtheearningstestabovetheFullRetirement
New Evidence on the Labor Supply Effects 3Age(FRA).WhiletheFRAusedtobe65,itwasgraduallyraisedbymuch
earlier legislation to 66 and later to 67 beginning with those reaching age
62 in 2000.The high earnings thresholds set in 1996 (e.g., $31,800in 2005)
now apply between the ages of 65 and the FRA.
Identification of earnings test effects in our analysis. In this paper, we em-
phasize that recent rule changes generated shocks that altered actual
Table 1
Earnings Test Rules



















1989 62–64 6,480 50 65–69 8,880 50 65
1990 62–64 6,840 50 65–69 9,360 331
3 65
1991 62–64 7,080 50 65–69 9,720 331
3 65
1992 62–64 7,440 50 65–69 10,200 331
3 65
1993 62–64 7,680 50 65–69 10,560 331
3 65
1994 62–64 8,040 50 65–69 11,160 331
3 65
1995 62–64 8,160 50 65–69 11,280 331
3 65
1996 62–64 8,280 50 65–69 12,500 331
3 65
1997 62–64 8,640 50 65–69 13,500 331
3 65
1998 62–64 9,120 50 65–69 14,500 331
3 65
1999 62–64 9,600 50 65–69 15,500 331
3 65
2000 62 until Dec
before reaches
FRA





2001 62 until Dec
before reaches
FRA




2002 62 until Dec
before reaches
FRA




2003 62 until Dec
before reaches
FRA




2004 62 until Dec
before reaches
FRA




2005 62 until Dec
before reaches
FRA




2006 62 until Dec
before reaches
FRA




Source: U.S. Social Security Administration (2005).
aThis is the FRA that applies for the cohort turning 62 in the given year.
Friedberg and Webb 4values of the earnings test threshold relative to what was anticipated by
people at the affected ages and altered anticipated values for younger
people. This variation, as shown in table 2, is richer than recent studies
have emphasized. Panel A of table 2 shows the value of the earnings
test threshold by year and age for cohorts born between 1928 and
1940. Panel B shows the values that would have been anticipated by
the same cohorts when they reached age 62; we assume that they cor-
rectly forecasted the rate of wage inflation (and thus the normal growth
in the annual value of the threshold) but not the legislation of 1996 and
2000.
3
This perspective reveals several interesting features. First, the 1996
jump in scheduled threshold values generated sizable shocks to earn-
ings test rules, although other recent studies focused entirely on the
2000 elimination of the earnings test. Moreover, the 1996 and 2000
changes may be confounded. Earlier studies simply compared labor
supply changes before and after 2000 to identify effects of the earnings
test. Yet the elimination in 2000 should be considered against a baseline
in which the earnings test threshold had risen for several years and
would have hit $17,000 in 2000, $25,000 in 2001, and $30,000 in 2002—
considerable amounts for people still working above the age of 65.
4
In considering both changes together, we can see that the range of
variation in anticipated earnings test rules stretches across numerous
cohorts. The timing of shocks to earnings test parameters is indicated
byshadingintable2.Inshadedcohort‐yearcells,actualthresholdvalues
roseabovewhatwouldhavebeenanticipatedbythecohortatage62.The
first cohort to experience such a shock was the 1927 birth cohort, which
turned 69 in 1996 and saw a small jump in the threshold in their last year
facing the earnings test. The last was the 1937 birth cohort, which turned
62in1999andwassurprisedbytheeliminationoftheearningstestabove
the FRA a year later.
The magnitude of the shocks is summarized in panel C of table 2,
reporting the discounted present value of actual and anticipated thresh-
old values, from an age‐62 perspective, summed over ages 62–69.
5 To
understand the calculations, note that actual and anticipated present
values are equal for the final cohorts, as they reached age 62 after
2000 and were not surprised by any rule changes.
The anticipated and actual present values of the thresholds diverge
forbirthcohorts1927–37.Thedivergenceissmallforearlycohorts,which
experienced changes in threshold values as they neared age 70. The gap
jumps for the 1931 cohort. They turned 62 in 1993 and would have ex-
pected an earnings test threshold of about $11,400 at age 65 in 1996 (it









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.was actually $12,500) and $13,900 at age 69 in 2000 (when it was actually
eliminated); this results in an anticipated present value of $75,323,
summed up at age 62, and an actual present value of $109,471, about
one‐third higher. The gap reaches a maximum for the 1935 cohort, which
experienced an anticipated present value of $136,052 and an actual pres-
ent value of $230,438. The gap narrows afterward but remains notable
through to the final shock experienced by the 1937 cohort.
Ourregressionswillanalyzehowlaborsupplywasaffectedbycurrent
and by anticipated future parameters. Anticipated rules can matter if la-
bor supply choices have long‐lasting consequences, for reasons that we
review shortly. Moreover, if labor supply exhibits inertia, then current la-
bor supply can also reflect the influence of earlier earnings test rules, so
we include contemporaneous and anticipated parameters that were in
place at younger ages as well. While our analysis is obviously reduced
form,sinceweestimatetheeffectofpolicyparametersbutnotafullyspec-
ified model of labor supply, the use of past and future policy parameters
can nevertheless identify the presence of important dynamic effects.
The deferral of benefits. Before we discuss the theoretical effects of the
earnings test, we take note again of the rules governing the relationship
between the earnings test and later benefits. Just as future benefits are
raised for people who delay claiming Social Security in the first place,
they are compensated with higher future benefits for each month’s
worth of benefits lost to the earnings test. Before the FRA, the actuarial
adjustment raises future benefits by about 7% for each year’s worth of
lost benefits. Over the FRA, the Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC),
which does the same, has risen gradually from 3% in 1990 and will
reach 8% in 2008.
6 A7 % –8% credit is actuarially fair on average, so
someone with average life expectancy and no borrowing constraints
should be indifferent about the timing of benefit receipt.
These credits undermine the long‐run fiscal gains from the earnings
test and should reduce the impact of the earnings test on current labor
supply. Many beneficiaries appear to react to the earnings test, nonethe-
less, probably because the credits are not well understood. The earnings
test’s impact is confirmed by the clustering of beneficiaries who keep
their earnings right around the threshold value, as demonstrated in nu-
merous papers mentioned later. Articles in Money and the Los Angeles
Times describing the earnings test failed to note that future benefits are
raised if current benefits are reduced.
7 Similarly, Reimers and Honig
(1993, 1996) found no evidence of increased labor force reentry when
the DRC was raised. Consequently, we ignore their effects, as have
many other researchers.
New Evidence on the Labor Supply Effects 9B. Theoretical Predictions
In this subsection, we discuss predicted effects of the earnings test on
labor supply under a variety of assumptions about the flexibility of la-
bor supply choices.
Unconstrained labor supply. Figure 1 shows the piecewise linear budget
constraint generated by the earnings test, while abstracting from other
taxes for simplicity. Implicit in figure 1 are two important assumptions:
the first, which we just discussed and maintain through our analysis, is
that people view the earnings test as a tax rather than an actuarially fair
deferral of benefits, and the second is that people can choose to work
any number of hours at their going wage.
The resulting budget constraint has a kink at the earnings test thresh-
old and a reverse kink when benefits are exhausted. The jump in the
earnings test tax rate from 0 to 33%–50% at the kink is large in absolute
terms and in comparison to most of the rest of the government tax and
transfer system. Yet, the impact of the earnings test on labor supply is
ambiguous, depending on where someone would locate on the budget
constraint in its absence. Beneficiaries with earnings below the thresh-
old experience no change in incentives and, hence, in labor supply due
to the earnings test. For beneficiaries with somewhat higher earnings,
the earnings test induces a substitution effect from facing the tax rate,
leading to lower hours, and an income effect from the loss of benefits,
leading to greater hours. The substitution effect will induce some ben-
eficiaries to reduce earnings just to the kink at the earnings threshold.
Fig. 1. The earnings test
Friedberg and Webb 10Last, beneficiaries with high enough earnings will face only an income
effect from the loss of benefits and will work more.
Constraints on static labor supply. Considerable evidence suggests that
workers face constraints on their labor supply choices. Such constraints
include the concentration of work schedules at 40 hours per week, lower
wages that are offered in part‐time jobs compared to full‐time jobs, and
government regulation of overtime work and of the provision of fringe
benefits to full‐time workers.
8 Thus, parts of the budget constraint with
low hours of work may be either dominated by fixed costs that workers
face or unavailable due to fixed costs that employers face. Other parts of
the budget constraint may consist of points that offer bundles of wages
and hours.
The effects of the earnings test will be altered if the budget constraint
is limited by these factors. Imposing the earnings test will cause fewer
people to adjust their labor supply, along with greater responses by
those who do adjust. One unambiguous prediction distinguishes this
model from the earlier one: the earnings test will now lead some people
to retire, as long as nonparticipation dominates some discontinuous
points on the budget constraint.
Constraints on labor supply transitions. In addition, some constraints
may cause labor supply choices to be persistent over time. It is likely
that there are fixed costs of changing jobs and even changing work
hours within a job, as search, hiring, and training are costly to workers
and employers. These costs may be exacerbated by the static constraints
described above; for example, the difficulty of finding a job offering the
particular wage‐hours combination that a worker prefers may increase
job search costs.
Such fixed costs will introduce inertia into labor supply decisions,
with amplified effects for older workers who have shortened time hori-
zons due to impending retirement. Even a worker who intends to post-
pone retirement indefinitely may find it difficult to credibly signal this
intent to potential employers. Transition costs are probably even greater
for people who seek to return to work after retiring and whose skills
may be eroded or outdated.
For these reasons, we expect a much smaller immediate response to
earnings test changes from people who are not working, given the diffi-
culty of returning to the labor force. Even among those in jobs, we expect
a muted impact early on. We expect to see a greater response as younger
workers with time to adjust their plans age into the new rules.
Thepersistence oflaborsupply choicescanalso cause changesin labor
supplyatother agesnotdirectlyaffectedbyachangeintheearningstest.
New Evidence on the Labor Supply Effects 11Knowing that the earnings test now disappears at the FRA instead of at
70,peopleintheirearly60smightpostponeretirementtotakeadvantage
of the higher return from working in their late 60s. They would do so if
thegainfromreturningtothelaborforceafterretirementinordertowork
after the FRA is dominated by the gain from staying in their jobs in the
interim. Similarly, people who are now induced to continue working in
their late 60s may stay in the labor force into their 70s, while before they
would not return to the labor force upon reaching 70.
These considerations expand the range over which the earnings test
may affect labor supply but also create empirical difficulties. A com-
mon strategy in the recent literature is to use slightly younger and older
workers as control groups to difference out other trends in labor supply
affecting the treatment group over the same period. These hypothe-
sized spillover effects of the earnings test undermine that strategy.
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C. Empirical Literature
The empirical approaches taken in studies of the earnings test can be
divided into three basic types—simple analysis of bunching at the earn-
ings test kink, regressions of labor supply on earnings test parameters,
and estimation of structural labor supply models. The studies also dif-
fer in the data and time periods that they study. A careful analysis of
these differences helps explain the mixed results from this literature.
Bunching at the earnings threshold. Many papers have demonstrated
that workers cluster at the earnings test threshold (Burtless and Moffitt
1985;Vroman1985;Friedberg1998,2000;GruberandOrszag2003;Haider
andLoughran2006;SongandManchester2007).Friedberg(2000)showed
that bunching of earnings at the threshold is statistically significant and
shifted significantly when earnings test rules changed. Clusters of benefi-
ciariesappearedatthe new higher threshold after itwas raised in 1978 for
ages 65–71 and disappeared after the earnings test was eliminated in 1983
for ages 70–71. Haider and Loughran showed that even more bunching is
evident when using accurate administrative data on earnings instead of
self‐reported data. Most recently, Song and Manchester used quantile re-
gressions and found significant increases in earnings at ages 65–69 after
2000, concentrated over a region of the earnings distribution that lay
somewhat above the earlier kink, and significant decreases over a region
below the kink.
The magnitude of bunching at the kink in the budget constraint
makes it clear that older workers enjoy some degree of flexibility in
their labor supply choices, in line with Ruhm’s (1990) observations
Friedberg and Webb 12about the prevalence of switches into “bridge jobs” after exits from ca-
reer jobs. Also, older workers are much more likely to work part‐time
than prime‐age workers are.
10 Thus, the importance for older workers
of limits on part‐time work, difficulties in switching jobs, and other con-
straints remains an open question.
The appeal of studying bunching lies in its simplicity. It provides a
straightforward test that the earnings test has an impact, since it does
not require making inferences about where workers would otherwise
locate on the budget constraint in the absence of the earnings test.
11
The limitation of such analysis is that, without a model, it provides lim-
ited information about responses to other possible changes in the earn-
ings test. While Saez (2005) shows how to infer the local compensated
substitution elasticity from the magnitude of bunching at a convex kink,
that approach does not identify the income elasticity, which Friedberg
(2000) finds to be relatively important in magnitude for this age group,
and its use hasnotbeen extendedtobudgetconstraintsthat are discontin-
uous due to the reasons outlined earlier.
Labor supply regressions. Another approach has been to estimate aver-
age labor supply responses to earnings test parameters, with the goal of
analyzing aggregate responses while avoiding assumptions required to
specify labor supply preferences. Recent studies have focused on the
2000 change, and some analyzed changes that occurred in 1990 and ear-
lier, but none have examined the increase in the earnings threshold that
began in 1996. These reduced‐form studies estimated how work and
earnings relate to earnings test parameters, such as the earnings test
threshold and tax rate (Gruber and Orszag 2003) or dummies for the
earnings test being in place (Tran 2005; Haider and Loughran 2006;
Song and Manchester 2007).
12
This estimation approach cannot separately identify conflicting in-
come and substitution effects on hours of work, which again leaves
us unable to extrapolate from the estimates to other possible changes
in the earnings test. It can be used, though, to test one unambiguous
prediction noted above—the earnings test may induce people to retire
if labor supply is constrained in some way. Tran (2005), Haider and
Loughran (2006), and Song and Manchester (2007) all show that em-
ployment at ages 65–69 increased after the 2000 elimination of the earn-
ings test. Moreover, they show that this effect was stronger among
those already in the labor force and increased in magnitude over time,
so constraints that generate persistence in labor supply choices appear
to be important.
13 The first part of our empirical analysis builds on this
approach by using different data sets and more post‐2000 data, through
New Evidence on the Labor Supply Effects 132005, and, importantly, by looking at the 1996 as well as the 2000
change.
14 The second part of our analysis investigates responses to
not only current but also past and anticipated future earnings test rules.
Estimation of structural labor supply models.As t r u c t u r a lm o d e lf o r -
mally models the impact of the earnings test on after‐tax wages and
income and, hence, on labor supply. As an example, Friedberg (2000)
estimated a truncated maximum‐likelihood model of the choice of work
hours among workers, using repeated cross‐sections covering time pe-
riods before and after changes in the earnings test rules. Burtless and
Moffitt (1985), Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), Berkovec and Stern
(1991), and Rust and Phelan (1997) used longitudinal data to estimate
structural retirement models, allowing for distinct wages for full‐time
versus part‐time work. Burtless and Moffitt treated the earnings test
as a pure tax, while Gustman and Steinmeier incorporated the deferral
of benefits. Both estimated small effects of the earnings test on labor
supply. This may be a consequence of estimating a full model of retire-
ment, which inevitably focuses moreattention on finding parameter val-
uestoexplainthelargenumberswhoretirethanontherelativelysmaller
numbers who continue to work and face the earnings test. It may also
arise from modeling the budget constraint in this fashion, since it re-
quires simplifying the budget constraint to a full‐time and a part‐time
wage‐hours bundle and also imputing those bundles.
The most detailed recent treatment of the earnings test is seen in ex-
tensions of Gustman and Steinmeier’s analysis, especially in their 2004
paper. They use HRS data through 2002 and thus analyze the 1996 and
some of the 2000 effects, and they predict significant and large effects of
the elimination of the earnings test. Yet their model limits how the earn-
ings test can affect behavior in important ways. They allow for some
constraints on labor supply choices by assuming a single full‐time
and part‐time job option, though they do not directly incorporate costs
of changing jobs or reentering the labor force. They assume that every-
one is aware of all earnings test rules, including the increase in future
benefits due to current benefits forgone. The main innovation in their
model is to allow for differences in discount rates, so the reaction to the
elimination of the earnings test is concentrated among people who,
they infer, have a high discount rate.
Structural models like this one are attractive in providing coherent
predictions about responses to earnings test changes and about labor
supply parameters more broadly. However, such models face difficulties
in capturing heterogeneity in the types of restrictions that people face in
their labor supply choices and in their assumptions about awareness of
Friedberg and Webb 14government program rules. Therefore, there is some appeal in reduced‐
form studies that can reveal the impact of such constraints without hav-
ing to make a formal choice about how to model them.
III. Data
We use two data sources that report employment transitions and cover a
periodfrombefore1996untilafter2000.ThelongitudinalHealthandRe-
tirement Study (HRS) was not used in earlier studies of the earnings test
exceptinthestructuralanalysisofGustmanandSteinmeier(2004),while
theMarchCurrentPopulationSurvey(CPS)hasnotbeenusedtoanalyze
employment transitions in response to the earnings test as we do here.
Current Population Survey. We use the March CPS to focus on employ-
ment and single‐year transitions in employment. The CPS is a nation-
ally representative survey of employment status covering well over
100,000 individuals per month. The March supplement to the CPS re-
ports information for the previous year’s sources of income (allowing
us to determine everyone’s location on last year’s budget constraint in
relation to the earnings test) and labor supply (allowing us to analyze
labor force transitions into and out of work and across employers).
15
We select everyone in the CPS aged 55–74 between the years of 1992
and 2005. The resulting sample has, on average, 1,000–1,500 people per
age per year. In all of our analysis, we use survey weights so that our
statistics are nationally representative.
16 We can identify age only in
March, rather than on birthdays, so our knowledge of each respon-
dent’s earnings test parameters at transitional ages is imprecise. We de-
fine as those working last year anyone who worked at least 1 week. We
define as those working now anyone who reports being at work or in a
job but absent from work during the survey week.
Statistics on employment and earnings for the sample are shown
in table 3. Employment rates rise through the period, as documented
inFriedberg(2007),butthetimingdiffersacrossagegroups,withgreater
gainsduringthe1990sforages55–61,throughouttheperiodforages62–64,
and in the 2000s for ages 65–69.
Health and Retirement Study. The HRS is an extremely detailed, nation-
ally representative panel survey of older Americans that is conducted
every 2 years. It can be used to follow employment transitions from
1992 on. While it collects much more detailed information on labor sup-
ply and income, its primary disadvantages relative to the CPS is the
smaller sample size and the absence of the full age ranges of people
who might be affected by the earnings test.
New Evidence on the Labor Supply Effects 15The main cohort of interest is the Original HRS cohort. It consists of
12,521 individuals born in 1931–41 and so aged 51–61 in 1992 and 59–69
in 2000, along with their spouses. In order to analyze people aged 58–74
in every year from 1992 on, we add respondents from other cohorts.
The AHEAD (Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old) cohort
consists of individuals born before 1923 and thus aged 70+ in 1992.
The CODA (Children of the Depression) cohort was born in 1923–30,
entered in 1998, and hence were aged 62–69 in 1992, at the beginning
of the period we examine. The WB (War Babies) cohort was born in
1942–47, also entered in 1998, and were 57–62 in 2004, at the end of the
period we examine.
Respondents in the HRS were asked to consent to having their rec-
ords linked to data on earnings reported to the Social Security Adminis-
tration.
17 We used these linked earnings data through 2004 to determine
annual employment status, although this will miss workers in noncov-
eredjobs,primarilythoseworkingforsomestateandlocalgovernments.
IV. Empirical Results
We begin by showing graphs of work, full‐time work, and earnings by
age group and year preceding and following the 1996 and 2000 earnings
test changes. Because it can be difficult to visually distinguish aggregate
laborsupplytrendsfromresponsestotheearningstest,wethenemploya
Table 3
Means (Standard Errors) of Key Variables
March Current Population Survey, 1992–2005
Age 55–61 Age 62–64 Age 65–69 Age 70–74
Age 57.8 (2.0) 63.0 (.8) 66.9 (1.4) 71.9 (1.4)
Worked last year .705 .491 .296 .169
If worked last year:
Real earnings last year 46,749 (53,686) 39,568 (52,337) 30,582 (48,022) 25,705 (46,689)
Working now .900 .798 .760 .744
Full‐time last week .791 .662 .501 .398
Working last week .642 .399 .232 .131
If worked last week,
worked full‐time .787 .656 .494 .392
Working last week:
1992–95 .616 .364 .209 .116
1996–99 .641 .393 .219 .126
2000–2005 .654 .422 .256 .144
N 126,352 45,817 71,023 62,770
Note: The CPS samples are weighted using March supplement weights to make the sta-
tistics nationally representative.
Friedberg and Webb 16regressionframeworktoidentifyshiftsinlaborsupplythatcoincidewith
and follow changes in earnings test parameters, and we specifically
quantifyhowchangesinanticipatedearningstestrulesaffectlaborsupply.
The analysis begins in 1992, which provides a few years to identify labor
supply patterns before the 1996 change. The analysis ends in 2003–5, de-
pending on the data set and the outcome variable that we focus on.
A. Graphical Analysis
Work and nonwork. Analysis of 1‐year labor supply transitions for large
samples in the CPS demonstrates the persistence of labor supply
choices. Figure 2 shows employment rates for age groups from the late
50s to early 70s between 1993 and 2005. The stock of people working in
jobs appears in figure 2A, while the flows into work by people who
were working or not in the previous year appear in figure 2B and 2C.
These flows reveal two general features. First, the majority of people
working in a given year continue to work in the next year (see fig. 2B).
The survival rate in work diminishes by age but remains at over 65%
even for ages 70–74. Second, figure 2C shows that very few people re-
turn to work after not working at all in the previous year. The hazard
rate into work is always under 5% and diminishes with age.
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Next we show that employment flows reveal more about the earnings
test than does the stock of employment. In figure 2Awe see that the em-
ployment rate at ages 66–69 shows small blips upward in 1996 and 2000;
however, employment increased gradually over this period for workers
at all ages from 55 and up.
19 The flows in figure 2B and 2C reveal clearer
responses.
At ages 66–69, the flows continuing to work and returning to work
both rise in 2000, while the flow continuing to work rises in 1996 as
well. In figure 2C, the jump in the flow returning to work, while statis-
tically significant, subsided after a single year. This back‐to‐work rate
almost doubled from slightly under 1% in the late 1990s to 1.7% in 2000,
but it accounted for less than one‐fifth of the overall gain in the employ-
ment rate in 2000, compared to the late 1990s average. Moreover, the
immediate drop back to earlier rates suggests that slightly younger
workers promptly adjusted their exit decisions.
Meanwhile, the percentage staying in a job at ages 66–69 shown in
figure 2B rose from 73%–75% in the early 1990s to 77.3% in 1997, then
dropped a little, and then rose to 78.1% in 2000 and peaked at 81.2% in
2004. Also interesting are the gains in the percentage of slightly older
and younger workers, aged 62–64 and 70–74, staying in jobs after 1996
New Evidence on the Labor Supply Effects 17Fig. 2. Source: Data from March Current Population Surveys of 1992–2005. Additional
details are provided in the text.and 2000. The increase for older workers appears with a lag. These ef-
fects suggest that younger and older groups who were not directly sub-
ject to the rule changes also respond to the earnings test.
Next we will decompose these gains for full‐ and part‐time workers
and along different parts of the earnings distribution. After that, we will
use regression analysis to help sort out underlying shifts in labor supply
from those that coincide with and follow the earnings test legislation.
Full‐ and part‐time work. Figure 3A and 3B shows the percentage of
people working full‐time and part‐time last week, among people who
worked last year. Conditioning the sample on working last year focuses
on those who are most responsive to rule changes. Furthermore, we ex-
pect different responses by work hours since working full‐time often
subjects beneficiaries to the earnings test.
The graphs suggest that people responded to earnings test liberali-
zation by staying longer in full‐time work, as predicted. The percent
Fig. 3. Source: Data from March Current Population Surveys of 1992–2005. Additional
details are provided in the text.
New Evidence on the Labor Supply Effects 19working full time at ages 66–69, among those working last year shown
in figure 3A, rose a little after 1996 and by more after 2000, and in a
gradual fashion. Looking at part‐time work in figure 3B,w es e et h a t
there was no apparent change after 1996, so the gain in full‐time work
was fed by a drop in retirement. In contrast, part‐time work rates de-
clined after 2000, contributing to the increase in full‐time work. As we
saw with employment, full‐time work rates also rose for slightly older
and younger workers not directly affected by the rule changes.
Annual earnings. As we discussed earlier, liberalizing the earnings test
should have differing effects, depending on how much someone was
initially earning. We look for evidence of these differences by building
on the approach of Manchester and Song (2007), who examined how
quantiles of the earnings distribution of workers shifted before and
after 2000. They found that earnings between roughly the 30th and
40th percentiles declined somewhat, and earnings between the 60th
and 80th percentiles—which are in the vicinity of the earnings test
threshold values before 2000—rose considerably.







Figure 4A reports average real earnings between the 60th and 80th
percentiles by age group and year, and figure 4B reports the same for
the 30th and 40th percentiles. In figure 4A, real earnings at the 60th–
80th percentiles for people aged 66–69 rose following the 1996 and
2000 changes. Interestingly, the gain is somewhat greater after 1996,
which Manchester and Song do not study. Also, real earnings at pre-
cisely that part of the earnings distribution did not rise for slightly
younger and older groups, although their overall employment rose.
In figure 4B there is little change in real earnings in the 30th–40th per-
centile range associated with either the 1996 or 2000 rule changes. This
may occur because our data set is relatively small and our measure of
earnings less accurate, compared to the data that Manchester and Song
use.
B. Regressions
Approach. At this point, we use regression analysis to clarify the basic
patterns laid out above. This helps sort out background changes in employ-
mentfromresponsestotheearningstest,anditrelatesthoseresponsesto
Friedberg and Webb 20the magnitude of the earnings test changes. We exploit variation in earn-
ings test parameters experienced by cohorts at different ages and in dif-
ferent years. This approach identifies the presence of dynamic effects
resulting from changes in earnings test parameters by comparing esti-
mated effects on labor supply of only current earnings test parameters,
compared with past and anticipated future parameters. However, we
cannot discern the full extent of these effects, given inherent limitations
of our stripped‐down approach that are discussed below.
To undertake this analysis, we compute means by age and year of the
variables we analyzed above—employment, full‐time employment,
and earnings at different parts of the earnings distribution—and regress
the cell means on earnings test parameters. The parameters include not
Fig. 4. Source: Data from March Current Population Surveys of 1992–2005. Additional
details are provided in the text.
New Evidence on the Labor Supply Effects 21just dummies for the earnings test being in place, as in much of the re-
cent research, but also the value of the earnings test threshold. This of-
fers a way to incorporate a great deal of additional variation from the
1996 and 2000 rule changes. While Gruber and Orszag (2003) included
the current values of both variables (the earnings threshold and earn-
ings test dummy) as well, we extend the analysis by adding values that
are anticipated in the future and that were experienced in the past. Last,
we include a full set of age and year dummies to difference out fixed
age and time patterns in labor supply.
In total, we will use four variables that reflect currently applicable
and future earnings test thresholds for cohorts at their current age
and when the cohort is age 62 (or age 65 in another set of estimates),
along with four parallel variables for earnings test dummies. Thus, the
first of the four variables are the current earnings threshold and the cur-
rent earnings test dummy. The second are the present value of the
threshold and earnings test dummy that are anticipated from the cur-
rent age until 69. As we explained in reference to table 2, we assume
that people anticipate normal increases in the threshold associated with
wage inflation, but not law changes. We depart from table 2 by setting
the value of the earnings threshold at zero when there is no earnings
test; while we chose a high value (of $50,000) for exposition purposes
when using table 2 to describe the identifying variation, in the regres-
sions the earnings test dummies control for these instances. Last, we
include a third and fourth set of variables that are analogous to the cur-
rent and anticipated values just described, except that they are the val-
ues experienced by the cohort at age 62 (or at age 65).
A few limitations of this stripped‐down approach need to be recog-
nized. We hypothesize that the estimated coefficients are negative for
the earnings test dummy (as the earnings test leads people to limit
work) and positive for the earnings test threshold (conditional on the
earnings test being in place). Yet, if the latter is too positive relative
to the former, then eliminating the earnings test (and setting both the
threshold and dummy to zero) would reduce labor supply. This prob-
lem does not arise in most of our results, while a structural model
would avoid this naturally. Moreover, this reduced‐form approach can-
not capture all of the dynamic effects that might arise. In our formula-
tion, we will miss some responses that generate persistence at ages
other than 62 and 65. This limitation arises because we cannot control
for changes in four values—the annual and anticipated thresholds and
earnings test dummies—at every single past age. Capturing these ef-
fects would require a structural model that formalizes the impact of
Friedberg and Webb 22both expectations and dynamic constraints of the type that we have
highlighted. Thus, our analysis identifies the presence of dynamic ef-
fects at some ages, rather than their full consequences.
In order to define our sample for the regression analysis, we use ages
62–74 so as to focus on those affected by past and present earnings test
rules. Our time period covers the years 1992 to 2003–5 (depending on
the data set and variable) so as to include a few years before the 1996
and after the 2000 changes. We also limit the sample by beginning with
the 1925 birth cohort, which turned 65 in 1990, since earlier cohorts ex-
perienced a higher benefit reduction rate when they turned 65 before
1990, and that might have altered their labor supply after age 65.
Regression results. By way of comparison, we first report results in
table 4 that include only the current value of the earnings test threshold
and earnings test dummy, along with a full set of age and year effects.
A higher value of the current threshold raises labor supply in table 4, as
measured by employment, full‐time employment, and earnings, and re-
moving the earnings test raises labor supply as well.
Importantly, the results differ somewhat depending on the measure
of labor supply. The estimated effects of earnings test parameters are
generally significant except when using measures of current labor sup-
ply from the CPS. These measures report whether someone had a job or
worked full‐time last week, while the other measures report whether
someone worked at all or usually worked full‐time or what they earned
over a full year, both for this year (in the HRS) and last year (in the
CPS). Since the earnings test depends on labor supply and earnings
for the year, the variables based on last week’s status measure annual
labor supply with more error, which may explain the weaker results.
Thefullsetofresultsfortheage‐62andage‐65perspectivesisreported
intables 5and 6,respectively. Now,current values ofearningstestparam-
eters are less important when we include measures of future and past
parameters. The current values remain significant in a few instances,
and more often in the age‐65 analysis,while the variables reflectingfuture
and past values are significant in some of the other specifications. Joint
F‐tests give only occasional evidence of multicollinearity, but in any case
we will consider the joint effect of all the coefficients in simulations that
we undertake shortly.
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The upper and middle panels of table 5 show results for employment
and full‐time employment, and the lower panel shows results for earn-
ings on different parts of the earnings distribution. In the upper panel,
we find significant effects of values anticipated at age 62 on employ-
ment, as measured by having a job last week. A higher present value


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.of the earnings threshold anticipated at age 62 significantly raises em-
ployment at all ages, and a greater number of years in which the earn-
ings test is expected to apply, as anticipated at age 62, significantly
reduces employment. A 10% increase in the present value of the future
threshold values results in almost a half percentage point increase in
employment at the current age. The 1996 legislation raised the log of
the present value of future threshold amounts by 0.40, when comparing
the cohort reaching age 62 in 1995 versus 1996. This implies a 0.40 ×
0.0445 = 1.8 percentage point increase in employment for the latter co-
hort, which is a sizable share of the 5–6 point gain for workers in their
60s throughout the period we examine.
Next it should be noted that the results are sensitive to the definition
of work status, as we also found for the preliminary results in table 4.
When the dependent variable is defined as working at all during the
year rather than having a job last week, the estimated effects of earn-
ings test parameters that were anticipated at age 62 remain similar in
magnitude but are no longer statistically significant. The current value
of the earnings test threshold is now larger and significant, with a 10%
increase implying an 0.19 percentage point increase in employment
(and recall that the 1996 legislation raised the threshold by close to
10% per year through 1999). When, instead, employment is defined
based on having any annual earnings in the HRS, several of the coeffi-
cients are substantially larger; the estimated effects of the earnings
threshold and earnings test dummy values that were anticipated at
age 62 are more than twice as large.
A last point with regard to the employment results arises from an
interesting contrast with the graphs presented earlier. In figure 3, we
demonstrated the importance of controlling for last year’s labor supply
when evaluatingthe effect of current earnings test parameters. In table 5,
controlling for earnings test parameters that were anticipated well in the
pasthelpsdealwiththeseconcerns.Earningstestparametersanticipated
at age 62 have sizable effects on overall employment but not on current
employment conditional on working last year. On the other hand, earn-
ings test parameters that are currently anticipated until age 69 have big-
ger, though still insignificant, effects on the latter than on the former.
When we turn our focus to full‐time employment in the middle panel
of table 5, the results are generally similar, which is unsurprising be-
cause liberalizing the earnings test should encourage more full‐time
work at the expense of either part‐time work or employment. The values
of earnings test parameters that were anticipated at age 62 have signifi-
cant effects on working full‐time last week, and they are very similar in












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29magnitude to the first set of results we discussed for having a job last
week. The current earnings test dummy now has a sizable negative
and close to significant effect. We find greater effects for working full‐
timelastyearthanforworkingatalllastyear,withstatisticallysignificant
effects for the current value of the threshold, almost significant effects for
the current earnings test dummy, and statistically significant effects for
both values as anticipated at age 62.
In the lower panel of table 5, we analyze changes in earnings by look-
ing at behavior on different parts of the earnings distribution and/or
budget constraint. Song and Manchester (2007) found two interrelated
effects. They showed that earnings in the 20th–40th percentiles declined
somewhat for ages 65–69 after 2000, and earnings in the 60th–80th per-
centiles increased a great deal, showing that people responded by shift-
ing their earnings up. However, it is less straightforward to undertake
this analysis by doing a cross‐age comparison, since the conditional
earnings distribution differs greatly with age. We find several signifi-
cant effects, but they are somewhat difficult to interpret, so we will dis-
cuss their implications in a simulation exercise momentarily.
Last, we also employed a simpler test by measuring the percentage of
the full sample—workers and nonworkers—who had earnings above
the earnings test threshold that applies at ages 62–64. This is a relatively
low amount that rose by the rate of wage inflation throughout the pe-
riod but was not affected by legislation, and it may capture persistent
labor supply responses that begin at ages 62–64. We find that several of
the parameters have significant effects on the likelihood of earning
more than the age 62–64 threshold. Higher values of the current and
anticipated thresholds, along with the thresholds anticipated at age
62, raise this likelihood, while the earnings test being in place or antici-
pated at age 62 to be in place for longer reduces it.
In table 6, we define the retrospective earnings test parameters from an
age‐65 rather than an age‐62 perspective, and we limit the sample to ages
65–74. We find fewer significant effects, possibly because we have lost in-
formation(sinceage‐65surprisesforacohortareshorterlivedthanage‐62
surprises) that helps to distinguish earnings test responses from underly-
ing labor supply changes. Of interest, though, are significant effects that
correspond to the patterns in figure 2B and 2C. For example, the current
earnings test threshold and current earnings test dummy significantly
raise the proportion of the sample returning to work, which is driven by
the immediate response in 2000 at ages 65–69 that we saw in figure 2C.
Understanding the overall effect of a change in earnings test rules,
which alter actual and anticipated values over a period of time, is now
Friedberg and Webb 30more complicated. We use our estimates to simulate the elimination of
the earnings test in 2000. To do so, we determine how current and antici-
patedvaluesofthethresholdandearningstestdummywereaffectedand
then how those shifts got transmitted to labor supply via the estimated
coefficients that we have discussed. Since the estimates for current mea-
sures of labor supply were often less robust, we focus on full‐year mea-
sures. Recall, also, that the specifications are restrictive in allowing the
earnings test to generate persistence by altering labor supply only at
age 62 and not at other past ages.
When we predict the effect of eliminating the earnings test in 2000 on
working at all during the year as reported in the CPS, we find increases
at ages 66–68 of about a half percentage point and an increase at age 65
of 1.3 percentage points. The predicted effects on the same variable from
theHRSaresubstantiallygreater.Employmentin2000ispredictedtorise
by around 2 percentage points at ages 66–69 and by 3.5 points at age 65.
As cohorts then age, employment remains about a percentage point (1.5)
higher in 2001 and about a half a percentage point(0.9) higherin 2002 for
ages 66–69 (age 65). Moreover, employment rates at younger ages in-
creasebyabout1percentagepointduetotheshocktoanticipatedvalues.
We also find notable effects of the 2000 change on earnings at differ-
ent parts of the distribution. We find declines of a few hundred dollars
in average earnings in 2000 between the 20th and 40th percentiles of the
earnings distribution and gains of up to a few thousand dollars in the
60th–80th percentiles. Consistent with this, we also find increases in the
percentage earnings above the earnings threshold of a half to a whole
percentage point for workers in their late 60s in 2000.
V. Conclusions
In this study, we consider several issues that have received little atten-
tion in studies of recent earnings test changes. First, while other studies
have investigated the effects of the elimination of the earnings test in
2000 for ages 65–69, we also consider the increases in the earnings test
threshold for the same age group that were instituted gradually begin-
ning in 1996. The elimination in 2000 should be considered against a
backdrop in which the earnings test threshold was already rising and
was expected to reach considerable amounts in 2000–2002.
Second, we use data on labor force transitions to show that condition-
ing on last year’s labor supply is important in identifying responses
to earnings test changes in the current year. We find major differences
in how workers and nonworkers responded to the recent changes, and
New Evidence on the Labor Supply Effects 31we find that flows into full‐time versus part‐time work were altered as
well.
Third, we develop a regression framework to analyze how the persis-
tence of labor supply choices influenced responses to earnings test
changes. Our results reveal significant effects of past and anticipated
future earnings test rules on current labor supply. Overall, we predict
that the elimination of the earnings test in 2000 raised employment
among Health and Retirement Study respondents by around 2 percent-
age points at ages 66–69 and 3.5 points at age 65, with gains persisting
as exposed cohorts aged and also arising at younger ages due to the
shock to anticipated earnings test rules. These effects are masked when
considering the impact of only current earnings test parameters. As a
consequence, earnings test changes can affect labor supply of younger
and older workers in addition to the directly affected group.
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1. Economic theory predicts that the earnings test should deter labor supply only for
people who expect to die sooner than average, who cannot borrow against their future
increases in benefits, or who are poorly informed.
2. A series of earlier laws culminating in 1983 eliminated the earnings test at ages 70
and above.
3. It is reasonable to believe that the law changes were not anticipated in earlier years.
The 1996 and 2000 laws were enacted early in the year (on March 29 and on April 7,
respectively), and both were made retroactive to January 1. The 1996 law was not dis-
cussed in policy circles in the prior year. The Economic Report of the President of February
1999 discussed distortionary effects of the earnings test, but there was little media atten-
tion until bipartisan legislation was proposed in early 2000.
4. According to our tabulations using the March CPS of 1992–2005, $30,000 slightly
exceeds median nominal annual earnings—$29,000—of people aged 58–61 who worked
the entire year and exceeds the 75th percentile value for people aged 66–69 who worked
at all.
5. In making these comparisons, it is important to avoid confusing the absence of the
earnings test (and hence of an earnings threshold) with the presence of the earnings test
and a threshold of $0. In table 4, we impute a value for the threshold of $50,000 to repre-
sent the absence of the earnings test after 1999. In our regression analysis, we instead
attribute a value of 0 in those cases, while adding a dummy variable for the earnings test
being in place.
6. The DRC has been raised by a half percent every year since 1990 and reached 7% in
2005.
7. Simon (1996), Kristof (1997). Coile et al. (2002) found that many beneficiaries for
whom the adjustment is actuarially fair or better claim benefits early at age 62, suggesting
that the credits are not fully taken into account in the claiming decision either.
8. A very incomplete summary of this evidence includes Card (1990) on tied wage‐
hours contracts; Altonji and Paxson (1988) on wage cuts associated with transitions to
Friedberg and Webb 32part‐time work; and Hausman (1980) and Cogan (1981) on fixed costs of work. The rel-
evance of such constraints in affecting retirement is summarized by Hurd (1996).
9. The earnings test may also affect younger workers through life cycle labor supply
effects. Under this model, reducing the tax at older ages would lead to a shift in labor
supply from younger to older ages; but given our focus on constraints on labor supply
choices, we do not think that this type of intertemporal shifting is likely to dominate.
10. Of 65–69‐year‐olds working in the 1990s, 49.2% worked usual part‐time hours (less
than 35 per week), compared to 14.2% of 50–59‐year‐old men. These statistics are com-
puted using supplemental weights for all men who worked last year in the March CPS
from 1992 to 2000 (Friedberg 2002).
11. Testing the related prediction that people should avoid the nonconvex kink in the
budget constraint is difficult because its location is difficult to measure for households
with dependent benefits and for age‐eligible workers who are not receiving benefits.
12. Gruber and Orszag (2003) and Song and Manchester (2007) also showed that Social
Security benefit claiming rose when earnings test rules were relaxed. These results con-
firm that many people view the earnings test as a tax; otherwise claiming and labor sup-
ply decisions would be delinked if benefit deferrals (due to delayed claiming or due to the
earnings test) were perceived as actuarially fair.
13. Gruber and Orszag (2003) and Haider and Loughran (2006) found no change in
employment following the 1983 elimination of the earnings test for ages 70–71, in contrast
to the results for 2000. Haider and Loughran employed the same data and methods to
look at both changes; they speculated that the older age of those affected in 1983 limited
their response, and they showed a diminishing response by age in 2000.
14. Our data extends the analysis of others by another 2–3 years. Song and Manchester
(2007) and Haider and Loughran (2006) had the advantage of accurate information on
earnings, benefits, and birthdays from administrative panel data. Our data from the
HRS also include administrative records on earnings. They could not observe hours of
work in their data and so distinguish the contribution of hours choices to earnings. While
Haider and Loughran also used survey data that were matched to administrative records,
those data sets from the late 1970s and early 1980s are quite old.
15. Tran 2005 matched across monthly CPSs to generate a series of 1‐year panels, but
doing so induces attrition bias that our use of the CPS avoids. Households at a particular
address are in the CPS for 4 consecutive months, out for 8 months, then in for 4 more
months. The CPS interviews the new household at that address if the old households
moves. Since moving out of jobs is correlated with moving out of one’s house, matching
will undercount labor supply transitions and generate attrition bias.
16. We use the CPS basic weights and apply the adjustment factors developed by Povlika
and Miller (1998) for pre‐1994 weights. Stewart (2002, 2005) recommends this procedure
whencombiningretrospectiveandcurrentdataintheMarchsurveysacross this timeperiod,
as we do, because the 1994 redesign of the CPS had a small effect on the coding of employ-
ment and unemployment.
17. Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) examine selection issues associated with refusals. In
the Original HRS sample of 1992, 71.6% were matched to their Social Security earnings
data. While some observable variables like race, wealth, and education have statistically
significant effects on matching, they explain little of the overall variation.
18. It is clear from the HRS that people are more likely to return to work after absences
that are shorter than 1 year.
19. When we look at age groups in the March CPS, we avoid at this point including
people aged 65, since we do not know when they turned 65.
20. As a deflator, we use Social Security earnings growth, as reflected in the normal
annual increases in the earnings test threshold.
21. Song and Manchester (2007) report annual earnings at the 60th, 70th, and 80th per-
centiles in 1999 for white males aged 65–69 of $14,961, $21,901, and $34,874. In our data,
the amounts are $18,000, $26,374, and $45,000.
22. When we test the joint significance of the earnings test parameters, there are a few
specifications for which the p‐value on the F‐statistic for all the parameters taken together
is lower than the p‐values on the current values tested separately from the past and an-
ticipated future values.
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